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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
TYLER CLIFF KNARR, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 44714 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2016-3079 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Knarr failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a unified sentence of 20 years, with 12 years fixed, upon his guilty plea to 
trafficking in heroin, with a second trafficking offense enhancement? 
 
 
Knarr Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 On February 2, 2016, an undercover detective made arrangements to meet with 
Audri Foster and Caven King, from whom he had previously purchased heroin during 
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controlled buys, to purchase nine grams of heroin for $1,800.00.  (PSI, p.82.1)  Foster 
told the detective that they “would need about an hour to go pick it up.”  (PSI, p.82.)  
The surveillance team subsequently observed King drive to Knarr’s residence to pick up 
the heroin, then return to Foster’s residence, where King and Foster weighed and 
packaged nine grams of heroin and sold it to the undercover detective for the agreed-
upon amount.  (PSI, pp.83-84, 112.)   
DEA agents later accompanied Knarr’s parole officer to Knarr’s residence and, 
upon searching the residence, they located approximately five grams of heroin, a digital 
scale with brown residue, spoons, several syringes, a “small amount” of marijuana, and 
$4,360.00 in cash.  (PSI, pp.113-16.)  DEA agents also found “numerous text-message 
conversations about buying and selling heroin in [Knarr’s] phone,” and an officer’s drug 
detecting K-9 alerted to the $4,360.00 of cash “after [the cash] had been placed in a 
clean area of the house.”  (PSI, pp.114-15.)  Knarr admitted that “he had been selling 
and using heroin for some time,” that he had recently sold heroin to several individuals, 
and that he was “a heroin source of supply to Caven King, Audri Foster, and others.”  
(PSI, pp.111-13.)   
The state charged Knarr with conspiracy to traffic in heroin (in excess of 28 
grams), trafficking in heroin (two or more grams, but less than seven grams), and 
possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.92-94.)  The state also filed an Information 
Part II, charging Knarr with having committed a second trafficking offense.  (R., pp.104- 
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Knarr 
44714 psi.pdf.”   
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05.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Knarr pled guilty to trafficking in heroin (two or more 
grams, but less than seven grams), with a second trafficking offense enhancement, and 
the state dismissed the remaining charges.  (R., p.103.)  The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of 20 years, with 12 years fixed.  (R., pp.116-19.)  Knarr filed a notice 
of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.127-30.)   
Knarr asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his substance abuse, claim 
that he is “committed to make the necessary changes,” and purported remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  The record supports the 
sentence imposed.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire 
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 
217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho 
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant must show 
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.  Id.  The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give 
them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; 
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its 
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discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of 
society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In deference to the trial judge, this 
Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 
148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).  
The penalty for trafficking in heroin (two or more grams, but less than seven 
grams), with a second trafficking offense enhancement, is a mandatory minimum of six 
years, up to life in prison.  I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(6), -2732B(a)(7).  The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of 20 years, with 12 years fixed, which falls well within the 
statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.116-19.)   
On appeal, Knarr contends that he “has taken responsibility for his actions” in the 
instant offense.  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  However, although Knarr initially admitted to 
DEA agents that he had been selling heroin “for some time” and that he was “a heroin 
source of supply to Caven King, Audri Foster, and others,” he later (during his 
presentence interview) denied selling heroin to King or Foster; a denial that he appears 
to have maintained throughout the sentencing hearing.  (PSI, pp.5, 22, 111-13; Tr., 
p.32, L.21 – p.36, L.9.)  As such, it is clear that Knarr was not accepting full 
responsibility – either during his presentence interview or at the time of sentencing – for 
his actions in the instant offense.   
With respect to Knarr’s substance abuse, purported remorse, and claim that he is 
committed to making changes, Knarr has previously made the same assertions many 
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times, and yet has failed to make any rehabilitative progress and has repeatedly 
resumed the same criminal behavior.  (PSI, pp.10-11, 17, 71-74, 157, 162-63, 172-73, 
221-23, 234, 240, 252, 257-58, 263-64, 267, 280.)  He has been committing drug- and 
alcohol-related offenses since 2001, was adjudicated for or convicted of at least 14 such 
offenses between the ages of 14 and 29, and also admitted that he produced alcohol 
and “intravenously injected meth and heroin for a year” during a prior six-year prison 
term.  (PSI, pp.6-11, 162, 164.)  Knarr has previously participated in a plethora of 
treatment programs, including the Lifeline Therapeutic Community Program (while in 
prison), TC Aftercare, a rider at NICI (where he completed the “A New Direction” 
substance abuse program), Community Services Counseling, AA/NA, the Ada County 
Drug Court program, the Juvenile Drug Court program, substance abuse treatment 
while on juvenile probation, the Idaho Youth Ranch and Aftercare program, the 
SAS/EDI Residential program, “other outpatient and aftercare programs,” and a detox 
program at Allumbaugh House; however, he was frequently terminated from and/or 
failed to follow through with treatment.  (PSI, pp.11, 17, 71-74, 161, 222-23, 228, 231, 
237-39, 259, 277.)  As stated by the presentence investigator, Knarr’s known criminal 
history dates back 16 years and “is fraught with drug related offenses that no amount of 
prison-based treatment or community-based treatment seem to have any impact in 
mitigating his drug abuse and criminal conduct.”  (PSI, p.22.)   
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable 
to its decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Knarr’s sentence.  (Tr., p.38, 
L.15 – p.40, L.12.)  The state submits that Knarr has failed to establish an abuse of 
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discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing 
hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Knarr’s conviction and 
sentence. 
       
 DATED this 18th day of May, 2017. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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1 through the pathway they choose for him In six 1 involved in heroin. It really grabbed me. 
2 years. 2 That's all, Your Honor. Thank you. 
3 So, again, Judge, I'd ask the Court to 3 THE COURT: Is there any legal cause why 
4 consider some of those options. He Is a 4 Judgment can't be entered? 
5 relatively young guy. Like I said, he's got some 5 MS. REILLY: Unknown to the State, Your 
6 support. He's got some pretty good job skills. 6 Honor. 
7 And I've seen his tax returns because there's a 7 MR. LEWIS: No, Judge. I apologize for 
8 civil issue pending and in 2015 he made $38,000 as 8 prolonging this. There is one thing I forgot to 
9 a welder. So he's got some skills. He Just needs 9 mention. The records that I gave you are fairly 
10 to obviously be careful about who he's hanging out 10 Important for another reason. One of the deals 
11 with, get his addictions under control and 11 was conducted on February 2nd of 2016. My client 
12 certainly quit hurting himself and his family and 12 was In rehab during that particular buy and that's 
13 society by dealing drugs and hopefully he can turn 13 another nine grams and another $1,800. So that 
14 this around. 14 was part of what I'd denote to Your Honor as well. 
15 So, again, I would ask the court to 15 THE COURT: Based on your pleas of guilty, 
16 consider some of those options. Thank you. 16 Mr. Knarr, I'll find you guilty both of the 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 trafficking in heroin charge and the persistent 
18 Mr. Knarr, Is there anything you want 18 violator. 
19 to tell me before I decide what sentence to 19 As I've been trying to sort what the 
20 impose? 20 appropriate sentence is in your case and 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I'd just like to 21 considering those Toohill factors; protecting 
22 say I'm not trying to dodge responslbillty or 22 society, rehabilitation, deterrence and 
23 anything, but I am sorry about all of this. I 23 punishment, I'm reminded that part of the 
24 mean, It pains me to see these young people go to 24 calculation In sentencing Is the crime and a part 
25 prison, too. I wish I really had never got 25 of the calculation is the defendant. You present 
39 40 
1 a significantly different picture personally than 1 engage in conduct that puts the rest of the 
2 Ms. Perkins did with respect to history. Your 2 community at risk. 
3 crimes, it seems to me, are simply serious and I'm 3 My sense is there needs to be a 
4 left with the Impression after reviewing the 4 component that address clearly the protection of 
5 presentence investigation and the police reports, 5 society, but also specific deterrence to keep you 
6 that to some extent you got lucky that you didn't 6 from doing that sort of thing. 
7 have the requisite amount of heroin on your person 7 To that end I'm going to impose an 
8 at the time that the search was conducted because 8 aggregate term of 20 years in custody in the 
9 it appears to me that it is more likely than not 9 Department of Correction with a fixed minimum term 
10 that you were the source certainly for Mr. King 10 of 12 years followed by an indeterminate term of 
11 and likely for Ms. Perkins. 11 eight years. In addition to that I'll Impose a 
12 I have a difficult time justifying a 12 $10,000 fine. 
13 sentence that would depreciate the seriousness of 13 That would be the judgment of the 
14 that offense particularly in light of your 14 Court. Do you have any questions about the 
15 criminal history. Another trafficking Just a 15 judgment? 
16 couple of years ago and manufacturing in 2014. 16 THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
17 And you don't limit your criminal conduct to 17 THE COURT: Mr. Knarr, you have the right to 
18 substance abuse. You have theft offenses, 18 appeal this judgment. You have 42 days in which 
19 burglary, DU ls. And all of those things are 19 to take that appeal from the date j udgment is 
20 accumulated in the context of the State providing 20 flied and entered. You have the right to be 
21 every service that it can think of to try and 21 represented by an appeal in pursuing the appeal. 
22 support you making different choices. It appears 22 If cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
23 to me that It no longer matters what services we 23 appointed for you at public expense. Also, the 
24 provide, you are still likely, extremely likely, 24 payment of costs will be at public expense. 
25 to reoffend and when you reoffend you're going to 25 MS. REILLY: And, Judge, the State is 
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